reaching substantial changes. As outlined below, sub-national constitutional politics, in contrast to the gridlock at national level, has gained steam and might in the long run play an important role in redesigning the federal systems as a whole.
Bearing in mind that the properties and ambiguities of Austria's federal system have historical roots, the theoretical approach chosen here draws upon the insights of historical institutionalism which allows for assessing the characteristics and the working of institutions with reference to origins and path-dependent developments. In a nutshell, historical institutionalism is  historical in that its proponents employ causal claims stressing timing and sequencing.
Past choices, often made under conditions of uncertainty and involving contingent alternatives, are considered to delineate the boundaries within which future choices are made, and it is  institutional in that past legacies manifest themselves most obviously in institutional trajectories. Unveiling the historically constructed "grammar" of institutional configurations can, therefore, illuminate exactly how past events are causally related to future development (Broschek 2011: 541) .
In what follows I will first outline the origins of the federal republic, thereby focusing on foundational defects shaping the system down to the present day. Subsequently, the institutional and informal framework determining sub-national constitutionalism will be described and analysed. In the chapter on the practice of subconstitutionalism the focus is put on frequency and substance of changes that have been made so far. The paper concludes with a discussion of the potential impact of present reform initiatives on subnational constitutionalism and the changing relations between Länder and central state in the wider European context.
The making of the Austrian federation I
The roots of Austrian federalism trace back to the ancient Habsburg monarchy which, indeed, had not been a federation in a strict sense. Notwithstanding, though, the multinational composition inevitably implied some federal tradition, particularly in the wake of the Ausgleich of 1867 through which the Dual Monarchy with Hungary had been fixed (Burgess 2006: 93) , and when the regime increasingly had to cope with centrifugal forces fed by nationalist upheaval across the whole empire. Unsurprisingly, with the empire in disarray as a result of the lost war, these peoples, with the support of the Entente, promptly founded sovereign states of their own.
In the German-speaking remnants which all together represented no more than a small fraction of the original size of the huge territorial empire, the central authority had left a political vacuum (Burgess 2006: 93) with a prevailing mood of disorientation and a striking lack of prospects. No wonder that scarcely anybody supposed the rump state to be able to survive unless it joined a larger state, namely Germany. Eventually, the 1919 Treaty of St.
Germain made clear who had the real power to determine the country's fate. Article 27 ("The frontiers of Austria shall be fixed as follows […] "), in conjunction with Article 88 forbidding Austria "any act which might directly or indirectly […] compromise her independence", put an end to any ambitions of pan-German unity.
Under these premises the foundational process of the republic was a tedious process, finalized as late as November 1920 when the constitution of the Republic of Austria came into effect. At the very beginning, federalism had not been on the agenda, on the contrary, the Provisional National Assembly convening in October 1918 had aimed at founding a centralist state. The debate on why and how Austria eventually was structured on a federal basis has been controversial up to the present time.
One school of thoughts claims Austria to have been established in a first step as a centralist unitary state which, in a second step, devolved competences to the Länder. In fact, though, the process was more complex, as outlined in a recent historical study emphasizing that the first provisional constitution, adopted in October 1918, merely reconfirmed the imperial Landesordnungen (territorial law codes) of 1861 which assigned only rudimentary autonomy to the provinces (Wiederin 2011). However, within a short time the provinces, while accepting the constitution as kind of an indispensable "joint umbrella", II Thus, all Länder constituted themselves as autonomous albeit without claiming sovereignty in the sense of an independent state, but rather expressing the intent of linking to one another in a common federal state (Brauneder 1998: 202 
Institutional and informal framework: properties and ambiguities

V
In an international perspective Austria ranks among the group of countries which "describe themselves as federations while being so centrally dominated in design and practice as to be little short of unitary states" (Huegelin and Fenna 2006: 34) . This is mainly because the inconsistencies of the foundation process have lived on to the present day. The inherent constitutional shortcomings shaping the distribution of power between national and sub-national level are well-documented through single country studies (e.g. Bußjäger 2010b) as well as through comparative historical and political research (e.g. Burgess 2006;
Erk 2008), and there is little to add to the current state of knowledge. However, right when the focus is put on sub-national constitutionalism as a political arena closely depending on the scope of Länder autonomy, it makes sense to call to mind the relevant key points and findings in order to gain a balanced understanding of origins, actors, and functions.
Federal Council: second chamber with little authority
It is first and foremost the remarkable power asymmetry between the two houses of parliament that creates doubt whether the country is still to be considered a federal or rather a unitary country. The Federal Constitutional Law (Bundesverfassungsgesetz -B-VG) provides for supremacy of the National Council (Nationalrat) over the Federal Council (Bundesrat), markedly expressed in Article 10 assigning the "exclusive federal competence in both legislation and administration" to the former, thus leaving only residual competences to the second chamber (Pernthaler 2010: 112) . In the federal legislative process the The answer is to be found in the electoral system for the second chamber, and in the party political background framing Austrian federalism. The constitution provides that 
"Partyness" of federalism
In a multi-layered system political parties are a kind of integrative agents and, along with interest groups, important vehicles of centralization (Beyme 2010: 373) . In Austria, due to their all-encompassing presence at all levels, political parties have represented a pivotal element for cohesion and unification. Being a country with "strong parties in a weak federal polity", as Obinger (2005) 
Double loyalties: regional vs. centralist party interests
For long periods of the Second Republic, the "partyness of government" (Beyme 2007: 124) with regard to structures and processes in policy-making manifested itself in that Land election campaigns frequently were less determined by regional than by national issues, and quite often the outcome was considered as a barometer of public opinion on national politics (Dachs 2006b). With the SPÖ focusing on centralism this has always been beyond dispute; and also the ÖVP, by tradition much more federalist, has emphasized a "dual" party structure, i.e. regional sub-units plus nation-wide "leagues" (Bünde) along socioeconomic lines) in order to avoid or at least to mitigate centrifugal tendencies. Considerable change, though, has taken place since Austria's entry into the European Union in the mid1990s. Since then, regional elections have tended to be more determined by regional issues than in the past. Inextricably, "vertical integration may become a burden", and "[r]egional politicians may tend to dissociate themselves from unpopular 'party friends' at the federal level" (Detterbeck 2011: 249) . The national government, on its part, tends to emphasize centralism more firmly in order to make up for losses coming along with ongoing Europeanization. With this background, in particular when the need of reallocating competences is at stake, parties tend more and more to oscillate between promoting and blocking changes (Benz 2003) .
It is noteworthy in this connection that the intra-party influence of the regional organizations varies strongly with both Lager parties: Vienna and Lower Austria have always been the centers of gravity, with regional party leaders being anything but subordinate to their respective national party structures. There has always been some kind of "asymmetry-in-symmetry" in Austria's federal system -symmetry understood as constitutional equality of the national subunits, while asymmetry mirrors the differences of population and wealth affecting the constitutional units' political power relations with each other as well as their varying degree of influence on federative institutions (Tarlton 1965: 869; Watts 1998: 123).
The practice of sub-national constitutionalism
Types, modes and traditions
With regard to the historical development of sub-national constitutionalism since the founding of the First Republic, Koja (1998: 11f.) distinguishes three phases:
1. adjustment of state constitutions to the national constitution (a temporally uneven process, starting with Styria in 1918, and completed as late as 1930 when Upper Austria adopted its own constitution);
2. refoundation of the republic in 1945, followed by a long period of stagnation in which the Länder were essentially confined to replicating federal constitutional law with striking passiveness that did not change until the late 1960s;
3. significantly increased self-confidence of the Länder after the release of a constitutionalist's legal opinion attributing considerably more autonomy to the substates than initially thought.
As for phase three, it started in 1964 with a joint initiative of the Länder in which they claimed a strengthening of their competences in return for granting aid to the federation in a financially precarious situation (Funk 1988: 71) . The legal doctrine elaborated in this context, drew on the insight that state constitutions are not simply subordinated to the federal constitution, basically confined to implement federal law. Rather, notwithstanding the rule that state constitutions may in principle not affect the federal constitution VIII , there has always been some "relative" constitutional autonomy largely neglected so far (Koja 1988 (Koja /1967 . The opinion paved the way for a paradigm shift in constitutional politics encouraging the Länder to address the federal government with further demands.
The negotiations of the two decades that followed did not really result in substantial changes, albeit did not preclude important settings for times to come. Remarkably, by the way, the negotiations were conducted between federal government and state governors.
The parliaments of both levels, though directly concerned when changing the constitutional rules is on the agenda, were excluded from the talks -once again, a prime example of constitutional reality superimposing formal federalism (Fallend 2003: 28) .
The change in the relations between superstate and substates caused by the new doctrine of a "relative" Länder autonomy has persisted down to the present day, naturally circling around the question of how to define scope and limits of relative autonomy. Given that most federal systems provide just an "incomplete" framework leaving more or less "space" for the federal architecture to be filled by sub-national constitutional provisions and arrangements (Tarr 2011 (Tarr : 1133 , identifying and analysing scope, activities and substance of subconstitutionalism is both exciting and difficult. In search of patterns of subconstitutionalism in federal countries Dinan (2008: 841) highlights four crucial institutional features: (1) constitutional amendment and revision procedures, (2) opportunities for direct democratic participation, (3) the choice of a presidential versus a parliamentary system, and (4) the adoption of bicameralism versus unicameralism:
 ad 1: Sub-national constitutions are, as Dinan states, "invariably easier to amend than their national counterparts" (ibid.). As for Austria, the hurdle to be cleared is even lower than in most of the other federal countries: while the national constitution can be amended only by a two-thirds majority in parliament to be followed by an obligatory referendum, changes of a Land constitution require only a two-third majority of the Land parliament, without popular approval. It is worth bearing in mind, though, that in Austria the scope for sub-national constitutionalism is in general rather narrow (cf.
Gardner 2008: 333).
 ad 2: Other than at national level, instruments of direct democracy, as to be outlined below, can be adopted extensively in state constitutions, albeit in practice with some variety. For instance, Vorarlberg has always put emphasis on extending direct democracy (occasionally even at the risk that a law is repealed by the constitutional court) while some other states show themselves remarkably reluctant about this matter. Going beyond Dinan's useful list of features, it is important to regard that subconstitutionalism is to a considerable extent not just a matter of options but also a matter of political culture. In some of the Austrian Länder regional identity (note: other than, e.g., in Germany, in Austria there is no difference made between the terms Land and region) is strong, underpinned with historical heritage, traditionalism and patriotic sentiments. In others, again, citizens have a more rational view of the Land they live in.
Comparative studies show that there is a difference between the western and the eastern Länder: in Vorarlberg (36%), Tyrol (32%) and Salzburg (39%) emotional attachment to the Land is significantly higher than in the national average (25%), while citizens in the eastern states consider themselves to a higher degree as "Austrians" (Plasser and Ulram 2003: 433).
Obviously, there is a close correlation between regional identity and the attitude towards federalism: the citizens of Vorarlberg and Tyrol rank highest (75% resp. 74% compared to 59% nation-wide) with requesting a stronger role for the Länder in federal politics (Bußjäger et al. 2010: 38) .
Given the relevance of historical and cultural aspects, it makes sense to put them into consideration when comparing constitutions. In a recent empirically based thesis, Austria's nine Land constitutions are grouped in three categories (Moser 2010: 69-72):
 Styria and Vienna are states with pronounced positivistic constitutions which are decidedly confined to positive law provisions and abstain from inexact norms and promises that cannot be fulfilled, e.g., protecting and fostering marriage and family. 
Comparing constitutional profiles
Contents and properties
To say in advance, much of the contents of sub-national constitutions is predetermined in detail by the federal constitution having left little scope for flexible interpretation so far. As for the last-mentioned convention, the report submitted to the national parliament is not really stunning, and only a small number of the proposals has been implemented so far, yet it expresses a new stage in constitutional affairs. The same is true for the substates which in the last three decades all have extensively adapted their constitutions in accordance with the above-mentioned new legal doctrine which attributes "relative" autonomy to the Länder.
Compared to the national level, sub-national constitutionalism has been characterized by a considerably more dynamic development resulting in a wide range of changes regarding scope and substance, recent studies even identify "contours of distinct Austrian constitutional profiles at member state level" finding expression in "spirited innovations"
(Häberle 2006: 381).
XII
Before dealing in detail with sub-national constitutionalism in Austria, it must be noted that with regard to substance not every constitutional change earns the attribute "spirited innovation". Some of them fall primarily in the category of symbolic politics; others again lead to far-reaching alterations of single elements of the political system. With good reason, therefore, in this section symbols and general provisions are dealt with briefly while the latter category is examined more broadly, particularly changes of government creation procedures (i.e. proportional vs. majoritarian rule) and patterns of direct democracy.
Preambles, symbols and general provisions
Preambles to a constitution are widely used as introductory statements without any legal binding. Unsurprisingly, only a single of the Länder has one: Tyrol whose preamble affirms, among other things, "trust in God", "spiritual and cultural unity of the whole Land General constitutional provisions refer to a broad range of principles for specific government action and tasks to be fulfilled. In large part, at substate level it is primarily a matter of replicating federal constitution regulations. Given the narrow limits set by national law, Land constitutions tend to focus on (nonbinding, because unenforceable) fundamental rights and "state goals" (Staatsziele) as there are, for instance, committing to "family, marriage, equal treatment of housework and gainful employment, Sundays and legal holidays, regional patriotism, and subsidiarity" (Gamper 2012: 70) . Notwithstanding, with respect to general provisions, there is increasing heterogeneity among the Land constitutions simply because it allows for producing a specific constitutional style (ibid., 84 f.).
Government creation: Reluctant farewell to Proporz rule
With regard to Austria's political system, the term "Proporz" has an ambivalent meaning: In an informal sense it is a well-established term inextricably linked with the concept of consociationalism as laid down in the seminal works by Lehmbruch and Lijphart defining it as a societal arrangement typically for countries which in their historical development were unable or only insufficiently able to establish a viable, non-destructive system based on the ideal of competitive democracy (Schmidt 2010: 306-335 However, although enshrined in provincial constitutions drafted in the First Republic already, the system of Proporz government could fulfil its purpose not before 1945. Only from then on, the two Lager parties in office could rely on a balance of power both at national and substate level.
Beginning with the late 1970s, and accelerating with economic crisis in the 1980s, the essentials of Austrian consociationalism based on two-party dualism increasingly eroded.
At national level, entering a grand coalition had meanwhile become a risky game, and similar changes took place at Länder level as well. And as far as Proporz rule was concerned:
It seemed, the Moor had done his duty, the Moor might go. Proporz had not only become a burden for central parties, it had also become an ever-growing problem right for those parties that had been used to put majorities in proportionally composed Land governments.
As long as a predominant party can easily push through its will vis-à-vis its junior partners, all's right with the world. And it can make use of its right that the Land bureaucracy is directly and exclusively subordinated to the Land governor -a privilege that frequently has caused criticism (Luther 1990: 16) .
With shares of votes gradually shrinking and finally falling under the 50 percent mark, though, formerly power-conscious parties have lost ground. As of 2015, there is only one party at provincial level left (the ÖVP in Lower Austria) still holding an absolute majority in parliament. As soon as the early 1990s, the Land Salzburg took the lead and started considering a change from proportional to majoritarian rule for government election. After years of fruitless negotiations, though, there was no end in sight (Schausberger 1999: 258) .
Notwithstanding, in 1998, due to a political scandal -the FPÖ, holding a seat in government, had made public confidential computer data -all the other parties came to an agreement on changing the system at the very earliest. As a result, already in 1999, when provincial elections were to be held, the new government was built on the basis of majority rule. Simultaneously, in Tyrol following the example of Salzburg, the government was elected along the same pattern (ibid.). 
Direct democracy
In a comparative study evaluating the scope and procedures for direct democracy in all Länder have constitutionally enshrined provisions for facultative referenda (i.e. vetoreferenda) which can be initialized top-down by the Land parliaments, and in most of them also through bottom-up initiatives by citizens resp. municipalities concerned -as is the case with Burgenland, Lower Austria, Styria, Tyrol and Vorarlberg. Without exception, though, subject to the vote of the people can only be laws passed by parliament and before coming into effect (Table 1) .
When including also municipalities, as the lowest level of a federal system, remarkable differences can be identified: At national level the attribute "cautious" is apposite while at Land level, with some variation, direct democracy instruments are slightly broader developed. At local level, by contrast, openness to civic participation is considerably higher.
Given that the legal framework for municipal politics is determined by Land legislation (therefore, it is a matter of sub-national constitutionalism), the commitment to granting direct rights to the "sovereign" is more far-reaching: three of the nine Länder provide for binding referenda based on initiatives supported by at least 20 (Vorarlberg) resp. 25
(Burgenland, Styria) percent of citizens (Karlhofer 2012: 150) .
Dynamics and efficiency of subconstitutional politics
As set out above, during 1918 to 1920, along with the tension-filled, contradicting, and As from the late 1970s, with the new doctrine of "relative autonomy" unfolding, the culture of subordination to centralist policy-making has increasingly been challenged (Bußjäger 2012 can be consulted by citizens in case they feel unjustly treated by public authorities.
As for EU affairs, Austria's access in 1995 entailed substantial changes for the Länder. Eventually, in 2007, the newly elected federal government (formed by SPÖ and ÖVP) followed suit and lowered the voting age for National Council elections, too. According to a constitutional homogeneity rule providing that at no level the voting age may be higher than for the Nationalrat, all election laws -including not only the four remaining Länder but also referenda, the election of the Federal President and even elections to the European Parliament -had to be adapted. Since then, Austria has been the only EU member, in a broader sense worldwide the only developed democracy providing for voting at 16 (Karlhofer 2010).
All things considered, apart from the election reform which notabene had started as a bottom-up process gaining national attention only later, Austrian sub-national constitutionalism is inherently a step-by-step story and therefore should not be overestimated (Bußjäger 2010a: 33) . On the other hand, right at the substate level there is some potential of change that should not be underestimated. Along with the recalibration of party systems at substate level, coming along with the decline of the formerly predominant catch-all parties SPÖ and ÖVP, the "partyness" of federalism is withering.
Heretofore, the stability of Austria's cooperative federalism has been seen in close Against this backdrop, gradual constitutional change at sub-national level may eventually turn out to be more effective than the big nationwide federal reform which has not really made progress in the past quarter-century. 
